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 ABSTRACT 
 
SECURITY IMPLICATIONS OF CONVERGED NETWORKS AND PROTECTING 
THEM, WITHOUT COMPROMISING EFFICIENCY 
By 
 
Saltuk Aksahin 
 
 
This  dissertation  has  extensively  looked  into  all  aspects  of  VoIP  commu-
nications  technology,  and  information  presented  in  preceding  chapters,  
which  build  up  a  solid  framework  to  discuss  the  conceptual  design  
model,  and  investigate  features  that  could  be  incorporated  for  actual  Pro-
jects,  with  parameters  that  are  tested  on  field  values.  The  dissertation  
follows  a  five-course  model,  for  answering  different  questions,  both  tech-
nical  and  businesslike,  around  central  issues,  that  have  been  crucial  to  
explanation  of  the  topic;  starting  with  a  general  overview  of  VoIP  tech-
nology,  analyzing  current  VoIP  encryption  methods,  identifying  security  
threats,  designing  a  robust  VoIP  system  based  on  particulars  discussed  
in  preceding  chapters,  and  finally,  a  VoIP  simulation.  
 CERTIFICATION STATEMENT 
 
I hereby certify that this dissertation constitutes my own product, that where the 
language of others is set forth, quotation marks so indicate, and that appropri-
ate credit is given where I have used the language, ideas, expressions or writ-
ings of another. 
 
February 11, 2007 
Doha – Qatar 
Saltuk Aksahin 
  
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to thank my family for supporting me throughout the months 
this study lasted.  
 
I also would like to thank SKYORYX JV (TAV – TAISEI) MEP team 
members’ for their support and patience. 
  
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 Page 
LIST OF TABLES vii 
LIST OF FIGURES viii 
Chapter 1. Introduction 1 
1.1  2 Advantages of VoIP
1.2  2 Limitations of VoIP services
Chapter 2. Literature Survey 6 
2.1 VOIP Security Basics 6 
2.2  9 Enterprise and carrier network architecture for secure VoIP
2.3  13 Security issues in p2p VoIP systems
2.4 Cross-layer security architecture (mobile communications) 16 
2.5 Carrier peering and session border protocol 18 
2.6  19 Security issues with NAT traversal mechanism
2.7  20 End user and hop-by-hop authentication techniques
2.8  21 Vulnerabilities in VOIP protocol, e.g. SIP
2.9 QoS impact due to security   implications 23 
2.10  25 Miscellaneous security issues
Chapter 3. Methodology/Simulation Setup 28 
3.1 VOIP project simulation 33 
Chapter 4. Results 36 
Chapter 5. Conclusion and Future Work 40 
5.1 Lessons learned 40 
5.2  44 Future activity
5.3  46 Prospects for future work
  v
 REFRENCES CITED 48 
Appendix A. VisualRoute software main interface 51 
Appendix B. Minitab Data Presentation 52 
Appendix C. Regression Analysis Report 55 
Appendix D. Moving Average Chart of Calls Dropped 56 
 
                     
  vi
 LIST OF TABLES 
 
 
 Page 
 
Table 1 : An example of how a Firewall allows or denies, a Destination IP address, 
from accessing data ...............................................................................................11 
Table 2 :  Voice Quality Measurement ........................................................................31 
Table 3 : Observations for connectivity with Skype from host server ........................35 
Table 4 : VoIP calculator result at 120 Kbps bandwidth, and 30 ms packet duration.37 
Table 5 :  Final Design Values for VoIP Project Simulation.......................................39 
  vii
  
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
 Page 
 
Figure 1: VoIP System in General .................................................................................4 
Figure 2: Simple Physical connection between LAN networks ..................................10 
Figure 3: Enterprise and Carrier Network Architecture design example ....................12 
Figure 4: Cross-layered architecture............................................................................17 
Figure 5: Sample Latency budget ................................................................................24 
Figure 6: Sample VOIP Network.................................................................................30 
Figure 7 : VoIP Calculator...........................................................................................36 
Figure 8 : Moving Average Cell Chart ........................................................................39 
 
 
 
  viii
 Chapter 1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Voice  over  Internet  Protocol  (VoIP)  is  the  communications  technology  that  enables  
users  to  route  voice  conversations  over  the  Internet,  or  any  other  IP  network,  
through  established  network  protocols,  that  bear  semblance  to  ARPANET,  and  the  
infrastructure  needed  is  conventional  fiber  optic  data  cable.  In  general,  phone  
services  via  VoIP  come  out  to  be  cheaper  than  Public  Standard  Telephone  Net-
work  (PSTN),  because  cost  savings  are  recorded  due  to  convergence,  wherein  
voice  and  data  are  carried  through  a  single  network.  VoIP  to  VoIP  calls  are  
generally  free,  whereas  VoIP  to  PSTN  phone  calls  bear  nominal  charges  
(PCWorld,  2005). 
 
There  are  3  principal  ways  of  fixing  VOIP  technology  in  order  to  make  phone  
calls  (VoIPinfo,  2006): 
Using  an  ATA :  An  Analog  Telephone  Adaptor  (ATA)  connects  an  analog  
telephone  to  a  VoIP  network,  through  an  Ethernet  Jack.  These are 
sometimes referred to, as VoIP Gateways.  They normally use SIP protocol. 
 Using  an  IP  Phone:  A  broadband  hard  phone  is  a  self-contained  IP  
telephone,  that  looks  similar  to  a  conventional  telephone,  but  instead  of  
a  conventional  phone  jack,  it  has  an  Ethernet  port,  through  which  it  
communicates  directly  into  a  VoIP  server.   
 VoIP  connecting  directly:  It  is  also  possible  to  bypass  VoIP  service  pro-
vider. This  is  the  route  map  for  such  an  arrangement. 
IP  Phone  -  Ethernet  -  Router  -  Internet  -  Router  -  Ethernet  -  IP  Phone 
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 1.1 Advantages of VoIP   
 
There  are  2  principal  advantages  of  using  VoIP  service,  which  explains  its  popu-
larity  in  restricted  bandwidth  telephony  (VoIPinfo,  2006): 
 Lower  costs:  As  discussed  earlier,  VoIP  to  VoIP  phone  calls  are  free.  
E.g.  FreeWorldDialUp,  Skype  and  Globe7  are  popular  services  to  this  
effect. Call  center  agents  are  the  biggest  beneficiary  of  VoIP  services 
 Increased  functionality  and  mobility:  Using  VoIP,  it  is  possible  to  auto-
matically  route  international  calls  to  a  VoIP  phone.  VoIP  phones  can  be  
carried  globally  without  paying  roaming  charges.  Alternatively,  using  in-
stant  messenger-based  services  like  Skype,  VoIP  calls  can  be  made  
from  any  computer  as  long  as  there  is  an  Internet  connection.  Many  
VoIP  services  are  coming  with  useful  features,  such  as  3-way  calling,  
call  forwarding,  automatic  redial  and  caller  ID. 
 1.2 Limitations of VoIP services  
 
(The  main  aim  of  this  Project)?  These are  some  of  the  problems  encountered  
with  VOIP  services.  Wherever  possible,  solutions  are  suggested  (VoIPinfo,  2006): 
 
 Fax  problems:  Currently,  not  much  is  been  developed  commercially  for  
sending  Faxes  using  VoIP.  A  fax  protocol  called  T.38  is  underway. 
 Dependence  on  Internet  connections:  VoIP  services  quality  varies  from  
country  to  country,  because  of  its  reliance  on  parameters  like  Internet  
speed,  bandwidth,  etc.  These  are  also  subject  to  power  outrages,  unlike  
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 conventional  phones,  although  UPS-based  systems  can  take  care  of  this  
problem,  somehow. 
 Security  and  transmission  difficulties:  Many  VoIP  services  suffer  due  to  
delay  in  transmission  of  voice  packets  (Latency),  there  is  echo,  jitter,  
packet  loss  and  other  Quality  of  Service  (QoS)  problems  associated  with  
VoIP  phones.  As  a  majority  of  VoIP  users,  still  do  not  subscribe  to  en-
cryption  services,  VoIP  poses  security  (eavesdropping)  hazards.  A  sub-
stantial  part  of  this  paper  is  dedicated  to  studying  this  phenomena,  and  
the  response  of  data  transmission  companies.   
 Miscellaneous:  Inadequate  caller  ID  functions  (sometimes,  VoIP  services  
cannot  trace  calls),  no  emergency  calls  provision,  no  free  calls  to  sub-
scriber,  all  these  problems  reflect  that  VoIP  is  still  in  its  infancy,  and  
there  is  sometime  before  it  can  pick  up. 
 
 
The  aim  in  this  Project,  is  to  investigate  the  current  security  implications  of  VoIP,  
and  to  run  VoIP  in  a  safe,  secure  and  reliable  manner.  The  main  objectives  of  
the  Project,  have  been  classified,  as  follows: 
 Overview  of  VoIP  Encryption 
 Analysis  of  current  VoIP  encryption  methods,  and  their  effects  to  the  
efficiency  of  VoIP  systems  (in  transmission  problems,  latency,  jitter,  
etc.). 
 Identification  of  risks  and  threats  in  a  VoIP  system  where  encryption  
has  been  allowed. 
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  Design  of  a  method/methodology  for  proper  and  reliable  VoIP  environ-
ment: 
 Simulation  of  proposed  technique  and  analysis  of  simulated  system  
(Case  Study  using  a  standard  VoIP  service) 
 
Figure 1: VoIP System in General 
 
 
The main aim of this project is to investigate the current security implications of VOIP 
and propose a method to run VOIP in a secure way. 
 
Research  objective:  To  look  into  different  aspects  of  Voice  over  Internet  Protocol  
(VoIP)  communications,  mainly  Security  and  Quality  issues,  and  deduct  pertinent  
data  for  using  in  a  real-time  VoIP  deployment  project.  The project aims are 6-fold:   
• An  overview  of  VoIP  technology   
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 • Identification  of  common  security  threats,  and  failure  mechanisms   
• Analyzing  current  VoIP  encryption  methods,  and  their  efficacy 
• Identifying problems with VoIP protocols, e.g.  SIP  
• Design Methodology  
• Project Simulation 
 
Content/Methodology:  In  order  to  answer  above  hypotheses,  and  based  on  stated  
security  requirements  mandated  from  experts  agreement  over  this  issue,  around  
13  security  ideas  have  been  short listed,  and  the  dissertation  has  proceeded  
alongside  to  take  into  account  any  key  data,  that  may  be  needed  in  developing  
the  answers  to  the  security  issues.  One  common  theme  overriding  security  pa-
rameters,  is  Quality  of  Service  (QoS)  values,  like  jitter,  latency,  and  packet  loss.  
In  order  to  solve  for  these  values,  the  dissertation  has  expanded  itself  into  Pro-
ject  Design,  and  Project  Simulation,  which  uses  proprietary  software,  like  Visual  
Route,  Minitab  and  VoIP  Calculator.   
 
Result/Conclusions:  VoIP,  as  proved  in  this  dissertation,  has  a  fascinating  devel-
opment  path  ahead,  and  as  per  stated  assumptions,  we  are  able  to  develop  a  
realistic  Design  framework,  for  this  technology  area,  and  verify  our  design  pa-
rameters  for  QoS,  successfully  through  Project.  All  calculations  have  been  shown  
in  Appendices,  and  the  central  objective  of  dissertation  has  been  satisfied  many  
times  over. 
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Chapter 2.  LITERATURE SURVEY 
2.1 VOIP Security Basics 
 
According  to  the  Telecommunications  Industry  Association,  Arlington,  VA,  at  some  
point  in  2006,  more  than  50%  of  all  new  private  branch  exchanges  being  in-
stalled  will  be  IP-based.  The  number  of  residential  VoIP  subscribers,  will  grow  
12-fold  to  about  12  million  (Cherry,  p.1).  Cherry  (2005,  p.6)  asserts  that  in  this  
era  of  speedy  telecommunications,  bandwidth  is  no  longer  an  issue,  as  there  is  
plenty  of  space  for  data  and  voice  to  be  dispatched  together,  and  that  the  two  
main  things  to  worry  about  in  VoIP  calls,  are:  Latency  (data  packets  are  deliv-
ered  too  slowly,  due  to  network  congestion),  Jitter  (variation  in  delay  of  packets,  
leading  to  packet  loss)  (Cherry,  p.8),  and  thus,  having  bandwidth  is  not  the  only  
solution  for  safe,  secure  and  speedy  telephony,  as  the  real  fault  lies  in  what  is  
known  as  the  last  mile  (Cherry,  p.7),  the  connection  between  home  PC’s  
Ethernet  port,  and  fiber  optic  cable.  Even  500  kbps  broadband  connections  can  
deliver  high-quality  PC-to-phone  telephony  (Cherry,  p.8),  provided  the  concept  of  
voice  delivery  is  clarified.  It  must  be  remembered  that  VoIP  encryption,  and  other  
security  discussions  are  interrelated  with  transmission  factors,  and  cannot  be  stud-
ied  in  isolation. 
 
The  typical  VoIP  encryption  system  utilizes  public-key  cryptography  (PKC).  Skype,  
e.g.  uses  Advanced  Encryption  Standard,  with  encryption  keys  that  are  256-bits  
long.  Users  log  in  into  their  personal  Skype  accounts,  and  are  then  recognized  
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 by  a  Skype  server,  across  the  network.  The  server  gives  each  party  a  key  
(Read  Skype  password)  to  enable  decrypting  the  encryption  key,  which  enables  
for  a  high-end  security  (Cherry,  p.10). 
What  it  basically  means,  is  that  VoIP  systems  are  broadly  governed  by  the  
method  of  encryption,  although  theoretically,  it  is  possible  to  eavesdrop  on  VoIP-
conversations  anywhere  in  the  network,  on  a   practical  scale  it  must  take  a  
hacker  (unless  he  knows  password),  2256  combinations  to  try  before  he  can  hack  
Skype.  That  is  as  safe  as  Online  banking,  and  credit  card  transactions  on  the  
Internet! 
 
So,  what  are  the  key  security  issues  for  VoIP?  According  to  ideas  furnished  at  
Computer  Society  (ComSoc)  seminar  on  this  topic,  experts  have  agreed  on  the  
following  key  issues,  worth  addressing  in  this  dissertation  (ComSoc,  2005): 
 Enterprise  and  carrier  network  architectures  for  secured  VoIP 
 Security  issues  in  p2p VoIP  systems 
 Cross-layer  security  architecture 
 Carrier  Peering  and  Session  Border  Control 
 Security  issues  with  NAT  traversal  mechanisms 
 Vulnerabilities  in  VoIP  protocols,  such  as  SIP   
 End-user  and  hop-by-hop  authentication  techniques 
 QoS  impacts  due  to  security  implications  (latency,  jitter,  etc.,  covered  in  
our  dissertation  case  study) 
 SPAM  and  DOS  attacks 
 Securing  interconnections  with  SS7  networks 
 Securing  Voice  over  WLAN  (VoWLAN) 
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Although  not  exhaustive,  answering  above  security  issues  can  enable  us  to  de-
velop  a  robust,  and  mature  VoIP  security  design,  for  this  Project  purpose.  The  
scope  of  this  stream  of  study,  stretches  the  furthest  advancement  in  R&D  related  
activities. Therefore,  we  must  restrict  our  design  to  this  effect  only.  The  above  
security  issues  address  a  majority  of  practical  problems,  that  are  faced  due  to  
VoIP  security  hazards. 
 
A  little  more  on  Advanced  Encryption  Standards  (AES)  before  we  proceed  further.  
According  to  the  Computer  Security  Resource  Clearinghouse  (CSRC)’s  declassified  
report  on  this  topic,  AES  is  defined  as  a  FIPS-approved  cryptographic  algorithm,  
that  can  be  used  to  protect  voice  data.  Encryption  basically  converts  data  into  an  
unintelligible  form  called  ciphertext;  decrypting  the  ciphertext  back  into  what  is  
called  plain  text  at  the  receiver’s  end  (CSRC,  p.1).  Before  initializing  any  AES  
software  bundle  into  VoIP  installation,  following  objectives  must  be  kept  in  mind: 
An  approving  authority  and  a  maintenance  agency:  Generally,  the  US  Secretary  
of  Commerce  is  the  approving  authority,  the  Department  of  Commerce  and  the  
National  Institute  of  Standards  and  Technology  are  the  maintenance  agencies. 
Specifications:  Federal  Information  Processing  Standards  (FIPS),  197,  Advanced  
Encryption  Standard  (AES),  (affixed). 
Implementations:  The  algorithm  specified  in  this  standard  may  be  implemented  in  
software,  hardware,  firmware,  or  any  combination  thereof.  
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  Where  to  obtain  copies:  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/  after  e-payment 
2.2 Enterprise and carrier network architecture for secure VoIP 
 
A  safe  and  secure  network  architecture,  must  have  the  following  components:  
1)Router  devices  2)Switch  devices  3)Load  balancing  devices  4)Firewall  devices  
5)Virtual  Private  Networks  (VPN’s)  (Microsoft.com,  2004) 
 
The  first  thing  a  VoIP  service  provider,  would  need  to  ensure,  is  what  is  known  
as  LAN  segment  architecture  definition,  which  forms  the  principal  infrastructure  
layer  for  any  Project  on  VoIP  service.  The  network  architecture’s  prime  role,  is  to  
combine  a  number  of  technological  solutions,  into  a  complex  environment  that  
performs,  a  highly  secure,  available,  scalable  and  reliable  service.  Enterprise-level  
network  architectures  generally  consist  of  a  holistic  mix  of  any  of  the  following  
technologies,  and  elements: 
LAN  segments:  Connectivity speeds between  hosts  and  devices  is  typically,  10  
MBPS  or  more. 
LAN  connectivity  devices:  Switches,  routers,  load  balancers,  etc. 
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Figure 2: Simple Physical connection between LAN networks 
Refer fig.2, which shows a real, physical network.  In  a  similar  way,  we  can  have  a  
virtual  network  on  L2  and  L3  switches,  which  improves  upon  transmission  speeds  
greatly,  and  must  be  strongly  encouraged.  Next  in  stage,  is  a  brief,  yet  implicit  
understanding  of  the  5  parameters  mentioned  in  VoIP  basic  infrastructure: 
Router  devices:  Switching  and  routing  devices  provide  efficient  movements  of  
packets,  from  one  device  to  another,  at  L2  terminal  of  the  OSI  model.  Devices  
that  perform  the  L2  switching  role,  can  learn  destination  addresses,  by  monitoring  
network  traffic.  Many  enterprise-level  switches,  have  the  capability  to  route  from  
segments  directly.  A  number  of  permutations  and  combinations  is  possible,  but  
the  best  router  devices,  are  selected  after  enough  deliberation  in  optimum  design  
needs. 
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 Load  balancing:  Load  balancing  is  an  activity,  that  facilitates  horizontal  clustering,  
where  multiple  servers  are  configured  to  perform  the  same  role  on  the  network.  
The  load  balancing  functionality  can  be  provided  by  a  software  in  any  two  ways:  
1)Distributed  (Each  node  in  a  cluster,  by  a  specified  algorithm  receives  a  packet  
destined  for  the  cluster),  and  2)Routed  (A  centralized  device  which  receives  every  
inbound  packet  destined  for  a  cluster,  and  decides  which  host  to  send  the  packet  
to). 
Firewall  devices:  The  firewall  services  control  the  flow  of  traffic,  between  network  
segments,  using  L3  addresses,  in  order  to  meet  security  requirements.  Most  fire-
walls  come  equipped  with  an  implicit  “deny”  rule,  which  means  if  a  request  does  
not  exist,  the  request  is  automatically  denied.  Refer Table 1 for more on that. 
 
Source IP Ad-
dress 
Destination IP Ad-
dress 
Action Port Protocol 
Any 208.217.184.6 Allow 80 TCP 
Any  10.1.0.5 Deny 25 TCP 
Table 1 : An example of how a Firewall allows or denies, a Destination IP address, from accessing data 
 
Virtual  Private  Networks  (VPN’s):  Digital  Modems,  WAN’s,  WPAN,  Wireless  are  
some  examples  of  private  networks,  that  can  be  supported  on  an  Enterprise,  and  
Carrier  network  architecture. 
 
Before  laying  VoIP  infrastructure,  all  service  companies  make  efforts  to  define  se-
curity  architecture.  It  starts  with  a  Security  Zone  definition,  where  it  is  specified,  
which  tier,  and  which  security  zone,  must  the  infrastructure  come  equipped  with.  
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 It   follows  with  network  role  definition,  and  finally,  design  of  the  entire  arrange-
ment.  There  are  plenty  of  design  options  available.  Fig. 3  is  one  example. 
 
Figure 3: Enterprise and Carrier Network Architecture design example 
 
Next-generation  network  architecture  goes  a  step  further  in  improving  upon  secu-
rity  issues   (MSForum,  2003): 
Call  agent/SIP  Server/SIP  Client:  This  provides  call  logic,  and  call  control  func-
tions,  e.g.  Caller ID,  Call  Waiting  and  interaction  with  application  servers  (p.7) 
Service  broker  and  application  server:  Service  brokers  are  present  at  the  edge  of  
service  provider  end,  and  allow  for  a  consistency  in  coordinating  various  applica-
tions.  Application  server  is  located  in  network  for  same  (p.8) 
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 Media  server:  Sophisticated  roles  such  as  playing  announcements,  tone  adjust-
ment,  interactive  voice  response  processing,  etc. (p.8) 
Gateways:  Signaling,  trunking  and  access  gateway  (p.9) 
Bandwidth manager:  It provides required QoS for the network.  (p.9) 
Edge  router:  It  is  located  in  service  provider’s  network,  and  is  mainly  used  to  
improve  packet  flow  at  ends.  (p.9) 
 
There  are  3  security  issues  that  a  network  architecture  takes  care  of  (p.10): 
Denial  of  service:  Sometimes,  legitimate  users  are  not  able  to  access  their  call  
service,  due  to  some  fault  in  network  configuration. 
Theft  of  service:  Sometimes,  a  subscriber  sets  a  VoIP  account  with  false  billing  
information  that  cannot  be  detected  by  network  architecture. 
Invasion  of  privacy:  Like  electricity  and  cable  connections,  network  can  be  inter-
cepted.  Every subscriber has an individual cable to prevent this. 
2.3 Security issues in p2p VoIP systems 
 
With  VoIP  theft  reaching  $1  million  in  2006,  two  arrests  having  been  made  so  
far,  at  least  15  p2p  VOIP  service  companies  (e.g.  Skype,  Verizon,  etc.)  have  
been  intercepted,  one  of  the  companies  having  been  hacked  up  to  $300,000  
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 (Waldron,  p.9),  security  issues  in  p2p  networks  are  of  paramount  importance,  and  
the  methodology  of  securing  p2p  systems,  are  the  focus  of  this  topic. 
 
As  per  Skype  method,  a  256  K  AES  infrastructure  device,  is  the  only  safe,  se-
cure  and  reliable  means  to  deliver  p2p  VoIP  services  (Waldron,  p.11).  The  archi-
tecture  used  for  this  purpose,  is  called  Public  Key  Infrastructure  (PKI).  Since  our  
case  study  is  based  on  Skype,  it  is  useful  to  discuss  the  code  signing  authority  
for  this  p2p  networking  client.  In  Skype’s  case,  VeriSign,  which  is  a  market  lead-
ing  authority,  provides  PKI  protection.  VeriSign  is  used  by  some  of  the  most  illus-
trious  online  service  clients,  and  its  network  is  literally,  like  an  impregnable  for-
tress. 
 
So, what does VeriSign basically do?  It  basically  vets  of,  vouches  for  and  binds  
public  keys  to  users.  This  is  done  by  carrying  out  software  at  a  central  location,  
with  other  coordinated  software  at  distributed  locations.  The  public  keys  are  em-
bedded  in  certificates,  which  are  nothing  but  electronic  algorithms  to  encrypt,  and  
decrypt  messages,  traveling  to  and  fro.  A  user  can  digitally  sign  messages,  using  
his  private  key,  and  another  user  (Skype)  can  check  that  signature,  using  soft-
ware  packages  (VeriSign,  2006). 
As  an  example,  here’s  a  sneak  peek  into  Skype’s  methodology  to  arrest  a  secu-
rity  violation,  using  PKI  infrastructure,  set  in  place  (SkypeSecurity,  2006): 
Problem  description:  A  security  bug  in  the  Skype  for  user  windows  has  been  
identified,  and  fixed. 
  14
 Discussion:  A  defaulter,  who  connives  a  Skype  URL,  that  is  malformed  in  a  par-
ticular  way,  has  done  it  due  to  incorrect  parsing  of  the  parameters,  by  system  
vulnerability,  especially  an  attack  on  the  source  code  of  the  web  page,  and  
which  leads  to  an  incorrect  file  transfer. 
Impact  and  affected  software:  All  Skype  releases,  before  2.5  are  affected  due  to  
the  attack,  and  the  impact  can  be  fatal. 
What  does  Skype  do?  The  preferred  method  to  install  security  updates,  is  by  di-
rectly  downloading  from  Skype  website.  For  Skype  with  Windows  OS  environment,  
the  digital  certificate  is  signed  by  “VeriSign  Class  3  Code  Signing  2004  CA”.   
 
A  security  bulletin  pop-up  feature  automatically  comes  up,  with  installation,  and  
the  threat  is  removed.  It  contains  an  array  of  base  vectors  which  have  a  correct  
display  scheme,  pre-assigned  by  VeriSign,  something  as  follows.   
 
Access Vector (AV) ........... Remote 
Access Complexity (AC) ....... Low 
Authentication (Au) .....,.... Not Required 
Confidentiality Impact (C) ... Partial 
Integrity Impact (I) ......... None 
Availability Impact (A) ...... None 
Impact Bias (B) .............. Confidentiality 
Computed CVSS base score: 3.5 
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 2.4 Cross-layer security architecture (mobile communications) 
 
When  talking  of  VoIP  services,  mobile  communications  using  wireless  technology  
is  an  important  issue.  Unlike  infrastructure-based  networks,  mobile  communications  
suffer  from  severe  performance  problems  due  to  their  dynamic  nature  The  me-
dium  is  shared,  and  interference-prone,  routes  are  unstable,  energy  can  be  a  lim-
iting  factor  for  sensor  nodes  (Winter  et  al,  p.1).  To  overcome  these  limiting  barri-
ers,  cross-layer  architecture  are  a  promising  alternative.  They  help  by  minimizing  
the  impact  of  above  problems,  and  increasing  the  scalability  and  reliability  of  
networks  in  mobile  communications  (Winter  et  al,  p.1).    
 
As  discussed  earlier,  in  the  chapter  on  enterprise  and  carrier  layer  architecture,  
layered  architecture  have  the  advantage  of  reduced  design  complexity,  more  
modularity,  and  improved  maintainability,  compared  to  monolithic  stacks  (p.1).  This  
modularity  allows  for  combinations  of  different  protocols,  flexibility  in  terms  of  trac-
ing  an  error  back  to  a  given  layer,  and  improving  the  general  performance  of the  
network  stack  (p.1).  The  main  problem  with  simple-layered  architecture,  lies  in  the  
fact  that  they  are  shared,  unreliable  mediums  leading  to  bit  errors,  high  collisions,  
high  delays  and  lowered  thoroughput  (p.1.  In  contrast,  cross-layering  provides  the  
unconventional  comfort  in  these  parameters,  by  sharing  information  among  differ-
ent  layers,  that  can  be  used  as  input  for  algorithms.  These  processes  of  informa-
tion  sharing,  are  coordinated  and  structured  somehow,  the  enhancement  of  the  
layered  architecture  is  preserved,  and  architecture  longevity  guaranteed  (p.2). 
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Figure 4: Cross-layered architecture 
 
 
The  cross-layered  architecture,  endeavors  to  maintain  a  network-wide,  global  view  
of  multiple  metrics,  such  as  load  balance,  battery  status,  and  routing  destinations  
(p.2).  In  order  to  discuss  simplistic  designs  of  cross-layered  architecture,  we  can  
consider  suitable  local  view,  global  view  considerations.  Local  view  consists  of  
specific  nodes,  that  can  be  used  for  local  optimizations  such  as  load  balance  
(p.3).  The  global  view,  tends  to  propagate  the  information,  by  collecting  numerous  
samples  of  information  from  local  nodes  (read  packets  of  information)  (p.3) 
Most  mobile  communications  companies  follow  what  is  called  Common  Data  Se-
curity  Architecture  to  implement  the  cross-layered  objectives,  downloadable  from  
http://www.opengroup.org/security/l2-cdsa.htm  
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 2.5 Carrier peering and session border protocol 
 
Both  Carrier  Peering  and  Session  Border  Control  are  important  security  issues  for  
VoIP  transactions.  It  is  with  this  sense  of  importance,  that  the  concepts  should  
be  made  clear.   
 
Carrier  Peering   refers  to  the  ability  to  interconnect  networks  (Sonus,  p.2).  While  
it  is  possible  for  all  carriers  to  interconnect  their  switching  nodes  directly,  this  is  
far  too  vague,  and  would  not  provide  the  kind  of  control  desired  from  such  inter-
connectedness  (p.2).  Therefore,  traffic  is  controlled  by  what  are  known  as  inter-
connects  or  peer  points  (p.2).  Peering  is  a  complex  process  of  interworking  pro-
tocols  and  variants,  as  well  as  digital  manipulation,  parameter  interpretation,  
screening,  route  prioritization  and  much  more  (p.2).  While  the  specific  require-
ments  and  protocols  change,  based  on  the  peering  point,  and  its  location  in  the  
network  topology,  the  primary  role  of  peering  device  is  to  secure  the  carrier’s  
networks,  based  on  SIP  protocol,  the  standard  for  VoIP  communications  (p.2). 
 
Important  facts  to  be  kept  in  mind  over  carrier  peering:  1)Back-to-back  conver-
sions  through  a  pair  of  media  gateways,  an  intrinsic  ritual,  that  raises  call  costs,  
and  also  degrade  performance  by  what  is  known  as  packetization  delay  (p.3)  and  
2)Signaling  must  be  converted,  from  SIP  or  H.323  commonly  used  in  VoIP  proto-
cols,  to  solve  interworking  problems  (p.3).   
 
Security  Carrier  Peering  performs  some  other  functions,  desired  in  VoIP  and  mo-
bile  communications  (p.3):  1)Billing,  i.e  to  generate  billing  records  when  a  call  is  
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 completed  2)routing  services  (8YY  translation,  ring  tones,  announcements,  and  
proportional  routing).       
 
Session  Border  Controls  (SBC),  also  called  Session  Awareness  Firewalls,  are  
primarily  security  devices  designed  to  protect  the  network,  like  any  security  fire-
wall  (p.4).  In  layman’s  terms,  the  functionality  is  crucial  for  a  robust  VoIP  system,  
that  can  fend  off  attacks,  by  problems  such  as  Denial  of  Service  (DoS),  and  un-
authorized  interference  by  illegitimate  users  (p.4).  So,  how  does  it  do  the  screen-
ing?  SBC’s  basically  provide  a  single,  or  small  range  of  IP  addresses,  through  
which  all  media  and  signaling  must  pass  (p.4),  and   other  functions  are  similar  to  
Carrier  Peering,  such  as  Billing,  Routing  services,  Traffic  flow  management,  etc.  
(p.4). 
 
Generally,  these  two  services  are  provided  by  Network  Solution  companies,  such  
as  Sonus,  and  Juniper,  based  in  CA,  USA.  For  economical  purchase  in  Project  
decisions,  it  is  useful  to  go  for  what  is  known  as  Juniper  Networks  VF-series  
Session  Border  Control  Solutions,  a  comprehensive  package  that  includes  service  
assurance,  hosted  NAT  traversal  mechanism  (more  on  this  in  next  chapter),  man-
aged  enterprise  IP  telephony,  and  most  importantly,  legal  formalities  (Juniper,  p.3). 
2.6 Security issues with NAT traversal mechanism 
 
In  earlier  chapters,  we  discussed  the  importance  of  routers  in  infrastructure  case  
studies.  In  real-life  scenario,  several  other  entities,  called  middle-boxes  affect  the  
quality  of  traversal  of  voice  packets,  by  inserting  the  flow  of  transport  protocols,  
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 or  by  translation.  Some  of  these  middle-boxes  are  common   names:  IP  tunnel  
endpoints,  markers,  proxies,  caches,  transport  relays,  modified  DNS  servers,  etc.  
(HIP  Research  Group,  2006).  In  layman’s  terms,  these  can  be  identified  as  stum-
bling  blocks  to  efficient  VoIP  communications.  So,  this  chapter  basically  deals  
with  VoIP  across  Network  Address  Translators  (NAT’s),  which  is  the  more  com-
mon  terminology  for  the  middle-boxes  (HIP  Research  Group,  2006). 
 
Although  this  subject  runs  very  deep,  it  is  possible  to  recommend  the  following  3 
security  activities  that  are  intrinsic  to  traversal  of  NAT  mechanisms  (HIP  Research  
Group,  2006): 
 Opening  pinholes  in  firewalls  (i.e.  loading  firewall  rules,  allowing  packets  
to  traverse),  and  creating  NAT  bindings  are  highly  security-sensitive  ac-
tions. 
 To  reduce  the  complexity  of  the  overall  protocol,  it’s  possible  to  use  
something  called  UDP  encapsulation,  which  is  used  to  correlate  outgo-
ing,  and  incoming  signal  values. 
 Using  NAT  extensions 
2.7 End user and hop-by-hop authentication techniques 
 
In  this  chapter,  we  will  mention  a  string  of  successful  techniques,  that  are  used  
in  end  user,  and  hop-by-hop  authentication  techniques  (Computer  Society,  2006): 
 
 Longer  addresses,  128  bits  compared  to  32  bits:  As  of  today,  there  are  
4  billion  IP  addresses,  that  will  grow  into  9  billion  by  2050,  not  to  men-
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 tion  the  cross-layered  architecture  functions.  That  would  lead  to  this  
demand. 
 Simplification  of  headers:  Processing  power  will  increase 
 New  extensions  to  support  Options,  and  Data  Integrity 
 Flow  labeling  capacity:  Labeling  of  packets  for  regulating  particular  traffic  
flow 
 Automatic configuration:  For faster VoIP transfer, plug-n-play automatic con-
figurations are desired. 
 Hop-by-hop:  This  carries  information,  that  must  be  processed,  and  car-
ried  by  every  node  along  a  packet’s  traversal  path.   
 Data  authentication,  fragmentation  and  routing:  this  is  as  per  discussions  
made  in  earlier  chapters. 
2.8 Vulnerabilities in VOIP protocol, e.g. SIP 
 
In  addition  to  providing  telephony  services,  any  VoIP  device  must  provide  for  
mechanisms  to  protect  from  toll  frauds,  eavesdropping  and  call-hijacking,  among  
other  things.  (Networksystemdesign,  p.1).  SIP  was  designed  only  for  the  purpose  
of  making  communications  possible.  The  SIP-based  VoIP  network  is  useful  from  
the  point-of-view  of  a  layered  approach  (p.2).  Threats,  and  therefore,  countermea-
sures,  can  be  mapped  to  the  layers  of  the  network-reference  model  (p.2).  The  
defense  strategy  mainly  consists  of  a  three-layer  security  model,  which  goes  as  
follows: 
 Infrastructure  security  layer:  Protect  and  secure  the  network  architecture 
 Network  services  security  layer:  Protect,  and  access  end  users. 
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  Application  security  layer:  Protect  and  secure,  SIP-based  communications 
 
Based  on  general  security  precepts,  each  security  layer  has  to  be  evaluated  
based  on  the  following  premises  (p.2): 
 Authentication:  Confirm  the  identity  of  communicating  entities,  whether  
individuals,  entities,  devices,  services  or  applications,  mainly  using  au-
thentication  guards. 
 Authorization:  Cross-checks  identity  for  role  and  access.  This  provides  
unauthorized  access  to  services,  and  identity  frauds. 
 Accountability/Audit:  Keeps  track  of  usages,  and  security  services,  and  
provides  early  intimidation  on  security  threats,  and  also  helps  in  recov-
ery. 
 Availability/Reliability:  Redundancy,  perimeter-protection,  and  hardening  
ensures  that  authorized  users  continue  to  have  access  to  network  ser-
vices,  despite  DoS  attacks,  and  other  security  hazards. 
 Confidentiality:  Encryption  of  communications  streams,  prevents  unau-
thorized  entry,  with  better  access  control. 
 Integrity:  Prevents  unauthorized  deletion  and  replication  of  data. 
 Non-repudiation:  A  method  to  prove  communications  actually  occurred. 
 Privacy/Anonymity:  Privacy  addresses  issues  like  phone  number  har-
vesting,  cell  pattern  tracking,  etc.  that  violates  user  privacy. 
 
For  private  network  systems  companies,  like  Juniper,  following  provisions  are  
made  to  ensure  SIP  Protocols  are  kept  secure,  and  user-friendly  (JuniperSIP,  
p.3): 
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  Stateful  signature:  Juniper  network  provides  signatures,  that  protect  
against  a  number  of  exploits,  that  target  Skype,  and  other  VoIP  ven-
dors. 
 Protocol  anomalies:  Recall  the  chapter  covering  how  Skype  fights  hacker  
intrusions.  That  is  a  summation  of  SIP  guides,  to  arrest  protocol  anoma-
lies,  which  may  vary  a  lot,  as  follows: 
 
SIP  Non-standard  method:  The  signature  detects  a  SIP  request  not  defined.  SIP  
Wrong  version:  This  can  get  automatically  corrected  by  proper  download  of  Skype 
version  (2.5  latest).  SIP  No  colon  after  command.  SIP  Method  Overflow.  SIP  un-
known  header.  SIP  Wrong  content  length.  SIP  No  Protocol  ID’s. 
2.9 QoS impact due to security   implications   
 
As  per  Research  paper  used  of  National  Institute  of  Science  and  Technology  
(NIST),  security  steps  discussed  in  the  dissertation  so  far,  cause  an  irreversible  
chain  of  impact  on  Quality  of  Service  of  VoIP  systems.  This  is  the  presentation  
of  findings  of  the  paper  (NIST,  2006): 
 Latency:  Latency  refers  to  the  time  it  takes  for  a  voice  signal  to  go  
from  source  to  destination.  Ideally,  it  should  be  zero,  but  there  are  up-
per  and  lower  toleration  limits  (p.19).  In  the  United  States,  acceptable  
limit  is  150  ms  for  one-way  traffic.  For  international  calls,  it  is  400  ms  
(p.19).  Any  VoIP  service  provider  must  allow  for  a  Latency  budget,  
which  may  look  like  this  (p.20): 
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Figure 5: Sample Latency budget 
 
 
 Jitter:  Jitter  refers  to  non-uniform  packet  delays  (p.21).  It  is  often  
caused  by  low  bandwidth  situations,  and  can  be  experimentally  detri-
mental  to  QoS  than  actual  delays.  Jitter  can  cause  packets  to  arrive,  
and  be  processed  out  of  sequence.  When  jitter  is  high,  packets  arrive  
at  their  destinations  in  spurts,  a  situation  that  is  analogous  to  several  
automobiles  coming  to  a  grinding  halt  at  a  traffic  signal.  There  are  ba-
sically  three  useful  mechanisms  to  control  jitter  (p.21):  1)Usage  of  a  
buffer:  It  is  used  at  the  endpoint  of  traffic,  where  the  buffer  has  to  re-
lease  its  buffer  packets  once  every  150  ms.  2)Routers  with  effective  
headers  3)Efficient  use  of  bandwidth;  a  great  deal  of  jitter  is  taken  care  
of,  by  effective  use  of  bandwidth. 
 Packet  loss:  VoIP  is  excessively  intolerant  of  packet  loss,  which  forms  a  
steady  order  indeed  (p.21).  Packet  loss  is  a  by-product  of  excessive  la-
tency,  or  jitter.  Compounding  the  packet  loss  problem  is,  VoIP’s  reliance  
on  RTP,  which  uses  unreliable  UDP  for  transfer.  By  the  time  a  packet  
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 could  get  reported  for  something,  OoS  always  gets  exceeded.  Packet  
loss  is  an  unavoidable  reality,  and  barring  increasing  bandwidth,  there  
are  no  other  independent  solutions  for  counteracting  packet  loss  (p.22).  
Miscellaneous  QoS  security  issues:  SIP  phone  endpoints  may  freeze,  and  crash  
due  to  high  rate  of  network  traffic.  SIP  proxy  servers  may  experience  failure,  with  
VoIP-specific  signaling  attack  of  under  1  MBPS  (p.22). 
2.10 Miscellaneous security issues 
 
VoIP,  being  still  at  a  nascent  stage,  security  issues  seem  to  be  proliferating  in  
response  to  its  growth.  Denial  of  Service  (DoS)  attacks  against  VoIP  is  a  real  
possibility,  as  gathered  by  an  interview  of  Frost  and  Sullivan  analyst  Jon  Arnold  
(Kuchinkas,  2004).  According  to  Arnold,  each  system  requires  a  terminal  adaptor  
node  if  it  has  to  take  care  of  the  DoS  problem.  Another  threat  is  Spam,  which  
works  similar  to  email  threats.  This  affects  the  SIP  code,  and  makes  the  lan-
guage  vulnerable  to  remote  code  executions  and  other  cracks  (Kuchinkas,  2004).   
 
The  majority  of  network  operators  use  access-control  lists,  and  destination-based  
BGP  blackhole  routing  as  the  two  primary  methods  of  mitigating  attacks  (Pap-
palardo,  2006).  According  to  the  report,  only  1.5%  companies  believe  in  reporting  
violations  to  law  enforcement,  mainly  because  of  avoiding  media  pressure  Security  
companies  come  up  with  suitable  packages  like  Peakflow  SP  anti-DDoS  software  
suite,  that  allows  carriers  to  detect,  and  mitigate  attacks  (Pappalardo,  2006).   
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 In  order  to  boost  network  security,  interconnections  between  nodes  is  supported  
by  what  is  known  as  SS7  architecture  (Signaling  System  7),  which  is  the  signal-
ing  control  system  for  the  US  and  much  the  rest  of  world  (Martinez,  p.1).  For  
Skype,  VeriSign  is  the  SS7  authority.  The  SS7  architecture  consists  of  a  high-
speed,  packet  switch  network,  connected  by  three  types  of  signaling  links;  Service  
Switching  Points  (SSP),  Signal  Transfer  Points  (STP),  and  Service  Control  Points  
(SCP)  (p.1). 
The  use  of  data  networks  to  transfer  real  time  voice  calls,  is  leading  to  prolifera-
tion  in  the  demand  of  SS7  systems. Free  VoIP  to  VoIP  calls  are  made,  best  in  a  
standard  SS7  architecture  (Martinez,  p.2).  Thus,  for  any  signaling  protection  mod-
ule,  it  is  compulsory  to  include  an  SS7  architecture. 
 
For  wireless  security  issues,  and  for  a  Voice  over  Wireless  LAN  deployment,  the  
first  project  goal  to  consider,  is  the  high  quality  calls  expected  by  users  (Jacobs,  
2006).  Aruba,  (www.arubanetworks.com)  has  a  full  range  of  solutions  over  this  
particular  domain.  Aruba’s  partners  include  some  other  big  names,  in  the  Wireless  
industry,  Spectral  Link,  Quote,  Chart,  Avaya,  voice-badge  maker  Vocera,  and  
software  designer  TeleSym.  The  objective  of  securing  VoWLAN,  lies  in  proper  
MAC  addresses  authentication,  and  WEP  analysis.  In  addition,  radio  frequency  
management  (RF)  and  load  balancing  are  the  important  functions  of  relevant  
VoWLAN  security  mechanisms  (Wi-fi  Planet,  2004).  The  Aruba  5000  switch  is  ca-
pable  of  handling  5000  calls  simultaneously,  mainly  due  to  codecs  and  compres-
sion  schemes  used  by  each  of  its  partners. 
 
  26
 The  problems  with  VoWLAN  start  in  their  setting  up  functions.  In  contrast  to  data  
over  wireless  networks,  VoWLAN  needs  are  much  more  complex.  The  basic  task  
of  Wi-fi,  is  to  provide  an  interoperability  testing  for  the  new  IEEE  802.11  equip-
ment  flooding  the  market.  It  is  up  to  the  technical  task  group  in  a  Wi-fi  Project,  
to  allow  for  more  expansion  in  its  current,  and  future  scope  (Frank  Bulk,  2005). 
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Chapter 3.  METHODOLOGY/SIMULATION SETUP 
 
Based  on  literature  sources  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  we  will  summarize  
our  knowledge  on  a  conceptual  design  framework,  for  a  sample  VoIP  Project. 
 
Basic  Components  of  VoIP  Infrastructure:  1)Router  devices  2)Switch  devices  
3)Load  balancing  devices  (All  LAN  devices  based  on  Ch  2.2)  4)Firewall  devices  
5)Virtual  Private  Networks  (VPN’s)  (All  security  devices  based  on  Ch  2.2)  6)Call  
Server  7)Gateway  8)MCU  9)Ethernet  Switch  10)Routers  (Other  components) 
 
As  per  (Ch 2.5),  it  is  prudent  to  arrange  the  components,  as  per  cross-layered  
architecture,  for  enhanced  load  balancing,  reduced  design  complexity,  and  higher  
modularity,  and  maintainability,  therefore  ensuring  suitable  packet  speed,  thus  en-
suring  the  design  is  ready  for  Mobile  communications  as  well. 
 
Type  of  VoIP  Project:  For  our  design  purposes,  we  will  examine  p2p  (peer  to  
peer)  VoIP  communications,  as  per  (Ch  2.3),  since  our  Simulation  experiment  will  
be  based  on  Skype TM,  which  is  a  p2p  communications  tool.  Central  to  a  p2p  
design  set’s  security  standards,  is  an  128-digit  AES-based  cryptographic  algorithm  
(Ch  2.1),  which  can  be  downloaded  from  http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/  after  e-
payment.  The  security  operates  out  of  a  Public  Key  Infrastructure  platform,  e.g.  
VeriSign TM,  which  attests  digital  signatures  to  all  VoIP  calls  being  made  (Ch  2.3).  
A  p2p  infrastructure  also  necessitates  a  standard  network  protocol,  which  the  data  
packets  can  identify.  As  per (Ch  2.1),  we  must  go  for  Sessions  Initiation  Protocol  
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 (SIP)  which  is  the  most  widely-used  network  protocol.  For  effective  protection  
against  security  breaches,  the  SIP  protocol  must  be  under  the  shield  of  some  
network  guard,  and  Juniper TM  (Ch  2.8)  is  a  leading  authority  to  provide  digital  
signature  authentication  for  secure  SIP  voice  transactions.  In  order  to  smoothen  
voice  quality  for  SIP  protocol,  there  are  some  techniques  to  be  kept  in  mind,  
called  hop  by  hop  authentication  techniques  (Ch 2.7).   
 
Security  framework:  Carrier  peering,  and  session  border  controls  are  effective  in-
struments  designed  to  improve  upon  current  security  protocols  (Ch  2.5).  These  
are  provided  by  network  solutions  companies,  like  Sonus TM  and  Juniper TM.  SBC’s  
provide  a  small  range  of  IP  addresses,  through  which  all  signal  communications  
must  pass.  Both  these  operatives  perform  some  other  vital  functions  desired  in  
VoIP  communications   1)Billing,  i.e.  to  generate  billing  records  when  a  call  is  
completed  2)routing  services  (8YY  translation,  ring  tones,  announcements,  and  
proportional  routing).  3)Caller  ID  etc.  We  also  need  appropriate  mechanisms  to  
perform  NAT  traversal  functions,  e.g.  overcoming  communication  roadblocks  like  
IP  tunnel  endpoints,  markers,  proxies,  caches,  transport  relays,  modified  DNS  
servers,  etc  (Ch  2.6).   
 
Improving  QoS:  Building  reliable  security  infrastructure  comes  at  the  cost  of  de-
clined  satisfaction  in  Quality  of  Service  (QoS)  for  VoIP  communications.  Here  are  
some  appropriate  measures  designed  to  improve  upon  this  factor  (Ch  2.9): 
• Latency:  Should  be  kept  between  150  ms- 400  ms  (for  international  calls) 
• Jitter:  Is  regulated  using  routers  with  headers,  or  buffer  instruments. 
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 For  best  QoS,  enough  bandwidth  is  a  must  as  proved  in   next  page,  and  broad-
band  networks  should  be  encouraged.  SS7  architecture,  and  VoWLAN  networking  
are  essential  for  a  p2p  broadband  experience  (Ch  2.10).  Aruba TM  is  the  biggest  
name  for  VoWLAN,  whereas  Juniper TM  is  used  for  designing  SS7  architecture.   
 
The  main  issue  of  concern  in  design  is,  Voice  Quality.  VoIP  is  a  synchronous  
and  real  time  application  (Qovic,  p.1).  When  it  combines  with  IP,  call  quality  
problems  may  result  (Qovic,  p.1).   
 
Figure 6: Sample VOIP Network 
 
 
In  considering  the  totality  of  VoIP  design,  we  must  examine  the  factors  that  
negatively  affect  voice  quality,  and  any  fault  tree  analysis,  must  take  a  subjective  
account  into  the  quality  of  service,  being  addressed  as  a  central  issue.  Perceived  
voice  quality  is  a  function  of  many  factors:  jitter,  delay,  echo  and  packet  loss  
  30
 (Qovia,  p.4).  Jitter  and  delay  have  been  covered  in  a  previous  paragraph.  Echo,  
is  caused  when  hybrid  circuits  in  a  telephone  network  convert  between  a  four-
wire  circuit,  and  a  two-wire  circuit  (p.4).  Echoing  occurs  when  there  is  an  audible  
leak between  sending  and  receiving  areas.  Echo  is  reduced  by  physically  shorten-
ing  the  distance  between  the  sending  and  receiving  circuits  (p.4).  In  order  to  
quantitatively  portray  the  performance  of  VOIP  modules,  it  is  important  to  ponder  
over  QoS  issues,  the  following  performance  table  is  useful  (Qovia,  p.5): 
 
Table 2 :  Voice Quality Measurement 
 
VoIP  deployment:  Table  2  will  be  of  great  help  in  the  course  of  Project  Simula-
tion,  in  next  chapter.  Meanwhile,  central  to  design  is  consideration  of  proper  de-
ployment  of  VoIP.  Deployment  of  new  products  has  always  been  a  great  chal-
lenge,  right  from  technology  officers,  to  network  administrators,  They  have  to  bal-
ance  productivity,  with  costs,  and  integrate  it  with  existing  infrastructure  (Rao,  
2004).  Other  issues  to  deserve  priority,  are  troubleshooting,  teething  and  compati-
bility  problems  during  initial  stage,  and  performance  tuning  and  maintenance  later.  
So,  here  we  discuss  different  parameters  connected  with  a  reliable  p2p  VoIP  de-
ployment  (Rao,  2004). 
• Bandwidth:  As  voice  is  more  sensitive  than  data,  bandwidth  requirements  
automatically  go  up.  VoIP  devices  should  be  configured  to  use  a  more  
bandwidth-intensive  codec,  such  as  G.729-A,  which  can  use  87.2  kbps  of  
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 NEB  (Nominal  Ethernet  Bandwidth).  Also,  existing  traffic  patterns  on  the  
network  should  be  identified.  If  it  is  already  congested  with  a  lot  of  broad-
cast  traffic,  it  would  definitely  affect  response  time.  For  best  results  in  p2p  
communications,  it  is  safer  not  to  merge  them  with  other  signals,  such  as  
TV  and  Radio.  When  deploying  VoIP,  it  is  mandatory  to  have  a  separate  
VLAN,  which  will  keep  the  voice  and  data  networks  separate  (Juniper’s  
VoWLAN  in  our  case).  Coming  back  to  bandwidth,  the  important  design  cri-
teria  is  to  ascertain  the  number  of  simultaneous  voice  calls  that  can  be  
made  over  WAN  links  (Ch  2.2).  For  this,  compression  technique  to  be  
used  should  be  known,  the  payload  size  of  voice  packets.  Some  VoIP  cal-
culators  are  available,  e.g.  in  Project  Simulation  chapter.  www.voip-calculator 
and  www.ixiacom.com  are  VoIP  deployment  modules  available  online. 
• QoS:  Typical  toll-quality  calls,  require  at  least  16-20  kbps  of  bandwidth.  
There  are  also  bandwidth  management  solutions  (Ch  2.9).  
• Handling  power  problems: Unlike  regular  phones,  p2p  phones  suffer  from  
power  outrages.  However,  a  good-built  UPS  is  an  effective  solution.  How-
ever,  a  good  bit  of  power  planning  from  source  end  is  desired,  as  to  how  
much  backup  power  is  needed.   
• Security  issues:  Apart  from  security  mechanisms  discussed  in  the  disserta-
tion,  the  network  should  be  subject  to  routine  maintenance,  taking  regular  
back-ups,  installing  anti-virus  software,  etc.  Also,  implementing  VoIP  per-
formance  analyzers,  like  “Appmanger  6.0”  from  NetIQ  for  smooth  functioning  
of  VoIP  is  a  good  idea.   
• Prerequisites  before  deployment:  1)At  each  LAN,  network  architecture  
should  be  such  that  at  least  70%  throughput  is  achieved  within  10  msec.  
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 2)Round  the  trip  delay  of  each  packet  of  IP  should  be  no  more  than  10  
msec.  3)Round  the  trip  delay  of  each  packet  in  LAN  and  WAN  together  
should  not  be  more  than  150  msec.   
 
Thus,  we  discussed  the  feasibility  of  a  proposed  VoIP  design,  and  the  enormous  
importance  to  be  placed  on  security  installations.  Next  chapter  will  deal  exces-
sively  with  a  safe  and  secure  VoIP  software,  (Skype),  and  the  strain  put  by  its  
security  paradigm  on  QoS  parameters,  e.g.  Jitter and Latency. 
3.1 VOIP project simulation 
 
Throughout  this  dissertation,  a  consistent  attempt  has  been  made  to  study  VoIP  
technology  with  the  aim  of  working  out  a  feasible  Project  on  an  actual  scenario. 
While  the  previous  chapter  spelled  out  details  regarding  elementary  design  con-
siderations,  this  chapter  will  undertake  a  Simulation  exercise  around  a  real  VoIP  
environment,  based  on  a  real  p2p  VoIP  software.  For  our  simulation  purposes,  
we  will  consider  Skype.  The  previous  chapter  dealt  with  design  background  of  
Skype.  Also,  in  earlier  chapters,  we  dealt  with  security  mechanisms,  a  great  part  
of  which  dealt  with  p2p  VoIP  software.  Before  proceeding  ahead,  it  is  important  
to  recapture  the  following  essential  points  of  Skype  software: 
 
• Skype  uses  p2p  network  to  overcome  the  barriers  of  firewall  and  NAT  tra-
versal  mechanisms,  using  routes.  The  p2p  model  is  different  from  the  cli-
ent-server  model  discussed  in  (Ch  2.2)  and  (Ch  2.4)  by  the  fact,  that  the  
user  directory  is  decentralized  and  distributed  among  nodes  in  the  network,  
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 with  the  end-user  nodes  (called  supernodes)  having  higher  bandwidth,  for  
increasing  clarity.  The  Skype  network  can  scale  a  user  base  of  100  million,  
without  the  need  of  a  centralized  network. 
•   Skype’s  code  is  closed  source,  using  proprietary  SIP  protocol  (Ch  2.8). 
 
• For  security  procedures,  Skype  uses  128-bit  AES  cryptographic  algorithm  
devised  by  VeriSign  (Ch  2.3),  and  users  have  to  log  in  using  their  unique  
ID’s  and  passwords,  and  is  one  of  the  safest  in  industry.  Skype’s  window  
rooms  makes  extensive  use  of  Carrier  Networking  and  Session  Border  
Controls  (SBC’s)  (Ch  2.5). 
 
 
For  Simulation  purposes,  we  will  make  real  calls  using  Skype  and  test  its  impact  
on  QoS  parameters,  as  well  as  Lines  and  Bandwidth  requirement  for  actual  field  
condition,  using  a  VoIP  calculator,  i.e.  for  a  given  packet  duration,  the  number  of  
voice  paths  permitted  for  any  range  of  bandwidth.  Using  data  as  suggested,  we  
can  perform  an  independent  statistical  analysis  too.   
 
VisualRoute2006,  http://www.visualroute.com/index.html  is  a  software  that  enables  
determining  whether  a  connectivity  problem  is  due  to  ISP,  the  Internet  or  the  
Web  site  being  visited,  and  pinpoints  to  network  where  the  fault  lies.  We  have  
used  VisualRoute  Business  edition  for  checking  Skype  calls.  These  are  important  
observations  for  connectivity  with  Skype  from  host  server. 
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 Hop %loss IP Address Location Tzone ms Network 
    | 62.216.129.146 | London, UK    ***** 308 FLAG Telecom 
    | 129.250.10.201 | Centennial, CO -7 313 FLAG Telecom 
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 2 10 | 129.250.2.38 | Centennial, CO -7 317
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 |     | 129.250.2.32 | Centennial, CO -7 320
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 4 10 | 129.250.2.122 | Centennial, CO -7 320
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 5 10 | 129.250.2.237 | Centennial, CO -7 317
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 6 10 | 129.250.16.11 | Centennial, CO -7 307
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 7 10 | 129.250.223.66 | Centennial, CO -7 311
| NTT America, Inc. NTTA-
129-250 | 8 10 | 198.173.5.35 | Centennial, CO -7 299
Table 3 : Observations for connectivity with Skype from host server 
 
As  per  above  observations,  the  call  was  made  from  London,  UK  to  Skype  server  
in  Centennial,  CO,  USA.  Note  the  number  of  routings  (7  et  al)  utilized  before  the  
call  connects  to  main  server.  As  discussed  earlier,  Skype  utilizes  these  routings  
for  NAT  traversal,  as  well  as  avoiding  firewalls. Also,  Skype  uses  End  user  hop-
by-hop  authentication  techniques  (Ch  2.7),  in  this  case  we  have  8  hops  between  
London  and  destination,  meaning  the  call  was  almost  instantaneous.  The  roundtrip  
time  (latency)  to  Skype.com,  as  shown  in  table,  is  299  ms,  which  is  a  third  of  a  
second.  Regarding  QoS  parameters,  packet  loss  never  exceeds  10%  as  per  Ta-
ble  2,  it  falls  above  200  ms,  which  is  defined  as  a  fairly  stable  zone  for  Interna-
tional  calls  (It  should  be  between  150-400  ms).  The jitter is at the most, 100 ms. 
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Chapter 4.  RESULTS 
 
The  aim  of  this  simulation,  was  to  show  Skype  is  a  reliable  VoIP  mechanism,  
despite  having  a  credible  security  infrastructure  in  place.  Indeed,  Routing  is  a  
very  significant  method  of  improving  end-user  Quality  of  Service.  Considering  the  
security  infrastructure  laid  for  Skype  calls,  the  model  may  be  replicated  for  any  
Project  on  VoIP.  Next  in  important  scheme  of  things,  lies  another  round  of  simu-
lation.  But,  this  time  we  shall  utilize  the  services  of  what  is  called  VoIP-
calculator.  http://www.voip-calculator.com/calculator/.  There  are  plenty  of  parameters  
within  which  a  VoIP  calculator  operates,  but  we  will  focus  our  attention  on  only  
one,  the  Erlangs  and  IP  Bandwidth  calculator,  which  quantitatively  estimates  the  
number  of  bandwidths  required  through  an  IP  based  network  for  a  fixed  number  
of  voice  paths.  Using  statistical  analysis,  we  will  determine  if  the  bandwidth  de-
sign  fulfills  a  statistical  fit  of  sorts.   
 
 
Figure 7 : VoIP Calculator 
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 As  per  Figure  7,  G.729A  is  the  most  common  codec  compression  scheme (Ch  
2.1).  The  frequency  with  which  voice  packets  are  transmitted,  have  a  significant  
bearing  on  the  bandwidth  required.  The  selection  of  the  packet  duration  is  a  
compromise  between  bandwidth  and  quality.  Lower  duration  requires  more  band-
width,  however  higher  duration  means  packet  loss.  So,  where  do  we  draw  the  
line.  For  this  reason,  we  test  different  calculations  for  different  ranges  of  packet  
duration,  and  arrive  at  a  good  ballpark  figure,  using  Statistical  means.   
A  little  explanation  on  different  calculator  parameters.  BHT  refers  to  Busy  Hour  
Traffic,  which  refers  to  the  number  of  hours  of  call  traffic  during  the  busiest  hour  
of  operation  in  a  telephone  system.  Blocking  refers  to  the  failure  of  calls  due  to  
an  insufficient  number  of  calls  available.  Typically,  a  figure  such  as  0.03  would  
mean  that  3  calls  out  of  100  attempted,  have  been  blocked.  Bandwidth  is  the  
amount  of  bandwidth  required  in  Kbps  to  run  the  traffic.  For  optimum  compromise  
between  duration,  and  packet  loss,  our  calculations  proceed  at  packet  duration  of  
30  ms  (3  samples).  Considering  bandwidth  is  fixed,  at  Broadband  speed  of  120  
Kbps,  we  concentrate  on  other  parameters  and  prepare  the  table  as  below.  Our  
ultimate  objective  is  to  fine-tune  a  solution  between  no. of  hours  allowed  on  busy  
traffic,  versus  no.  of calls  dropped  in  the  process.   
Busy Hour Traffic Calls dropped 
1.900 0.01 
2.250 0.02 
2.500 0.03 
2.750 0.04 
2.950 0.05 
3.100 0.06 
3.300 0.07 
3.450 0.08 
3.600 0.09 
3.750 0.1 
Table 4 : VoIP calculator result at 120 Kbps bandwidth, and 30 ms packet duration 
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 For  analysis  of  above  Simulation,  we  will  utilize  a  Statistical  software  called  Mini-
tab  14.0  (www.minitab.com)  Minitab  is  a  market  leader  in  the  field  of  Statistics.  
As  appears  above,  there  seems  to  be  a  lot  of  correlation  between  two  variables  
above.  Statistically,  we  verify  this  claim,  and  indeed  it  is  true,  as  the  Pearson  
Correlation  coefficient  of  Busy  Hour  traffic  and  calls  dropped,  comes  at  0.991  or  
99.1%  (Refer  Appendix  B).   
To  determine  other  statistical  values,  and  gather  inferences,  we  perform  a  sample  
regression  analysis,  with  Busy  Hour  Traffic  as  Predictor  (X)  variable,  and  Re-
sponse  (Y)  variable  (Refer  Appendix  C).  As per regression analysis done, we have 
the following results: 
 
Calls dropped = - 0.0915 + 0.0496 x Busy Hour traffic 
 
 
 
Also,  R-squared  value  at  S-value,  comes  at  98.1%, which  is  again  a  high  value. 
 
Thus,  both  correlation  and  regression  analysis  results,  point  to  the  fact  that  the  
more  we  clear  up  network  lines  to  accommodate  busy  traffic,  it  also  increases  
proportionately  the  number  of  calls  dropped,  due  to  obvious  increase  in  packet  
loss  rate  due  to  increased  traffic.   
 
In  order  to  statistically  determine  the  optimum  number  of  calls  that  may  be  
dropped,  for  achieving  our  bandwidth  versus  quality  compromise,  we  perform  a  
Moving  average  time  series  test  clearly,  points  1, 2, 3, 4, 9, 10 fail  the  test  and  
should  not  be  considered  for  design  criteria.   
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Figure 8 : Moving Average Cell Chart 
 
Thus,  for  safe  design,  we  can  consider  any  of  the  points  5, 6, 7, 8  and  based  on  
central  tendency  theorem,  we  therefore  opt  for  the  following  design  values: 
Bandwidth 120 Kbps 
Packet loss 10% 
packet duration 30 ms (3 samples) 
Coding algorithm G-729 A (8-bit compression) 
Busy Hour Traffic 3hours 
No. of calls dropped 0.052 
Table 5 :  Final Design Values for VoIP Project Simulation 
Of course with increase in bandwidth, the value “no.  of  calls  dropped”  decreases  pro-
portionately,  and  broadband  connections  are  therefore,  encouraged  for  VoIP  appli-
cations. 
  39
  
Chapter 5.  CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
5.1 Lessons learned 
 
  The  major  achievements  in  this  dissertation  are  summarized  as  follows: 
• A  blow-by-blow  account  of  every  single  domain  of  knowledge  that  the  field  
of  VoIP  incorporates;  the  basics  of  convergence,  inputs  from  agencies  con-
nected  in  different  applications  of  VoIP,  e.g.  VeriSign,  Juniper,  NIST,  etc.,  
major  security  initiatives,  actual  field  measurement  conditions,  Quality  of  
Service  issues  on  security  platforms.  Design  and  Project  Simulation  is  
based  on  a  strong,  yet  concise,  theoretical  background.  It  is  no  under-
statement  to  point  out  that  the  dissertation  has  managed  to  cover  ground,  
on  all  desired  areas  of  VoIP,  drawn  heavily  from  sound  academic  sources,  
and  is  a  user-friendly  manual  for  further  study,  or  Project  reference. 
• A  major  achievement  of  this  dissertation  is,  that  it  is  developed  along  the  
lines  of  13  security  questions,  gathered  from  expert  agreement  (Ch  2.1).  
These,  in  turn,  form  the  backbone  of  Project  Design  (Ch  2.2),  as  well  as  
Project  Simulation  (Ch  3.1).  Almost  all  intermediate  chapters  have  been  
presented  in  such  a  manner,  that  they  support  the  objectives  of  the  Pro-
ject. 
• In  each  chapter  dedicated  to  understanding  the  particular  security  issue  in  
question,  important  solutions  are  highlighted,  to  draw  learning  lessons. 
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 • Enterprise  and  carrier  network  architecture,  featuring  routing  devices,  load  
balancing  devices,  switches,  firewalls,  VPN’s  (Ch  2.2),  media  servers,  gate-
ways,  bandwidth  managers,  edge  routers  are  the  first  tier  of  scalable  net-
work  architecture,  to  be  used  in  laying  down  VoIP  infrastructure.  The  im-
portance  of  Routing  devices  in  reducing  Round  trip  time  for  making  calls,  
has  been  proved  in  VisualRoute  Simulation  experiment  (Ch  3.1).  For  en-
hanced  scalability,  cross-layered  architecture  is  a  very  strong  basis  for  im-
proving  on  factors,  such  as  load  balance,  better  firewall  alert,  and  flexible  
algorithms  (Ch  2.4).   
• This  dissertation  has  extensively  looked  into  the  phenomenon  of  peer  to  
peer  p2p  VoIP  communications  (Ch  2.3),  as  opposed  to  client  and  server  
architecture.  These  operate  on  a  standard  instant  messaging  interface,  and  
are  protected  using  Public  Key  Infrastructure  encryptions.  VeriSign,  is  a  
leading  authority  in  attesting  digital  signature  to  p2p  services,  like  Skype. 
• In  order  to  register  smooth  functioning  of  VoIP  networks,  and  introduce  ad-
vanced  features,  such  as  call  billing,  caller  ID,  translation,  ring  tones,  an-
nouncements,  etc.,  many  VoIP  agencies  (not  Skype)  make  use  of  intercon-
necting  nodes  in  their  networks,  called  carrier  peering  (Ch  2.5),  Session  
Border  Controls  (SBC’s)  are  used  for  filtering  of  a  narrow  range  of  IP  ad-
dresses,  and  prevent  three  main  security  hazards  from  happening:  1)Denial  
of  Service  2)Theft  of  network  3)Invasion  of  Privacy  (Ch  2.5).   
• Speed  is  the  most  significant  aspect  of  VoIP  communications.  Very  few  
networks  can  afford  delays  due  to  congestion  of  lines,  and  providing  
enough  bandwidth,  is  often  not  the  solution.  Many  VoIP  networks  have  to  
wind  their  way  around  intermediate  middle-boxes,  called  NAT  (Ch  2.6),  and  
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 from  end-user  side,  there  is  a  necessity  for  hopping  networks.  Some  hop  
techniques  have  been  discussed  in  (Ch  2.7).  In  VisualRoute  simulation  ex-
periment  (Ch  3.1),  usage  of  hops  is  depicted  as  a  standalone  function  of  
improving  upon  inefficiencies  creeping  in,  into  the  network. 
• This  dissertation  takes  a  look  into  the  impact  of  security  infrastructure,  on  
several  QoS  parameters;  latency,  jitter,  echo  and  packet  loss  (Ch  2.9).  La-
tency  is  an  unavoidable  reality  in  communications,  and  it  can  be  kept  
within  specification  limits  (150-400  ms),  whereas  jitter  is  non-uniform  delay  
in  arrival  of  packets,  and  it  can  be  fixed  using  buffers,  router  headers  and  
efficient  use  of  bandwidth.  (Ch 3.1) simulation deals with this area. 
• Like  any  other  communication  media,  VoIP  has  its  own  language  protocol,  
Sessions  Initiation  Protocol  (SIP),  although  H.323  and  other  languages  are  
also  used.  The  protocol  is  subjected  to  security  hazards,  and  thus,  requires  
to  be  vouchsafed  by  an  authentication  agency,  e.g.  Juniper  Network. The  
protocol  suffers  from  its  own  disadvantages,  in  terms  of  authorization,  au-
thentication  and  accountability. 
• Among  other  security  issues,  the  role  of  SS7  architecture,  and  VoWLAN  
have  been  detailed  in  (Ch  2.10).  In  order  to  boost  network  security,  inter-
connections  between  nodes  is  supported  by  what  is  known  as  SS7  archi-
tecture  (Signaling  System  7).  The  SS7  architecture  consists  of  a  high-
speed,  packet  switch  network,  connected  by  three  types  of  signaling  links;  
Service  Switching  Points  (SSP),  Signal  Transfer  Points  (STP),  and  Service  
Control  Points  (SCP).  VoWLAN  stands  for  Voice  over  Wireless  LAN  fea-
ture,  and  is  applicable  in  Project  Design. 
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 • With  all  available  data  at  our  disposal,  the  chapter  on  Design  (Ch  3)  col-
lated  a  sum  total  of  learning  lessons  for  the  VoIP  project,  and  a  concep-
tual  framework  on  a  cost-effective,  and  broadband  quality  VoIP  design,  and  
the  essential  parameters  that  would  be  needed  to  support  the  learning.  The  
main  themes  of  design  stem  from  an  eclectic  combination  of  the  best  
ideas  discussed  in  previous  chapters,  and  a  basic  deployment  and  imple-
mentation  scheme,  and  the  way  the  scheme  should  be  carried  out.  The  
deployment  incorporates  the  following  parameters:  troubleshooting,  teething  
and  compatibility  problems  during  initial  stage,  and  performance  tuning  and  
maintenance  later.  It  identifies  G.729  A  as  the  most  important  bandwidth  
codec,  and  87.2  Kbps  as  minimum  bandwidth  needs  for  reliable  VoIP  
communications,  16-20  Kbps  for  QoS  misalignments,  UPS  for  handling  
power  problems  at  source,  and  some  elementary  prerequisites  to  be  taken  
care  of,  before  the  design  can  be  open  to  audit.  The  main  purpose  of  the  
chapter  on  design,  has  been  to  present  a  background  for  next  chapter  
needs. 
• The  chapter  on  Project  Simulation,  (Ch  3.1),  is  the  single  most  achieve-
ment  of  this  dissertation,  as  it  applies  core  principles  gathered  from  study  
of  the  remaining  dissertation.  As  different  from  the  chapter  on  design,  this  
chapter  examines  how  and  why  QoS  parameters  and  bandwidth  metrics  
play  a  role  in  security-related  prerequisites,  and  must  be  given  due  credit.  
In  order  to  perform  real  life  simulation,  a  real  VoIP  service  provider  was  
tested  for  QoS  metrics.  Skype  was  chosen  because  it  is  currently,  the  
market  leader  in  p2p  VoIP  communications,  and  reports  drawn  from  Skype,  
can  be  helpful  in  ascertaining  Project  benchmarks.  The  first  test  consisted  
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 of  ascertaining  QoS  parameters  during  a  call  made  from  London,  UK  to  
Skype  server  in  CO,  USA.  The  results  for  latency  (round  trip  time),  packet  
loss,  jitter  come  well  within  established  control  limits,  and  the  Simulation  
experiment  serves  as  an  excellent  example,  of  how  theory  can  be  applied  
in  practice.  During  simulation,  special  mention  is  made  to  the  fact  that  all  
security  features  adopted  by  Skype  for  international  calls,  are  documented. 
 
Apart  from  QoS,  there  is  a  necessity  to  project  the  importance  of  bandwidth  
studies.  For  this  simulation,  we  utilize  an  agency  called  VoIP  Calculator,  which  
quantitatively  estimates  the  total  bandwidth  required  for  a  given  number  of  voice  
paths,  provided  other  parameters  remain  same.  The  parameters  we  test  in  this  
simulation,  include  Busy  Hour  Traffic  (BHT)  against  the  number  of  calls  dropped,  
other  parameters  remaining  same.  As  evinced  from  calculator  results,  there  is  al-
most  a  linear  correlation  between  the  two  variables,  a  fact  that  is  confirmed  later  
by  Statistical  analysis  using  both  correlation,  and  regression  methods.  Statistical  
analysis  is  also  used  to  find  an  optimized  value  for  number  of  calls  dropped,  and  
the  combined  results,  give  us  a  safe  set  of  design  values,  which  is  mentioned  in  
table   
5.2 Future activity 
 
Since  risk  assessment  on  any  VoIP  project  has  carried  itself  off,  for  around  six  
months,  the  future  course  of  activity  would  lie  in  carrying  out  an  actual  “simula-
tion”  for  the  Project,  and  not  just  computer-based  results,  which  comes  only  as  
an  exemplary  model.  It  is  important  to  realize  how  current  systems  affect  field  
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 work,  and  what  new  systems  can  be  utilized.  A  little  bit  on  futuristic  systems  is  
talked  about  in  (Ch  2.2).  Since  simulation  would  be  based  on  proposed  methods  
as  spelled  out  in  Design,  and  lessons  learned,  the  actual  parameters  will  come  
up  during  field  work  for  the  same.  The  main  functions  included  would  be  prepa-
ration  of  environment,  server,  equipment,  software  installations  and  configurations. 
VoIP  is  a  world-standard  application,  and  in  order  to  meet  world-class  quality  re-
quirements,  through  customer  feedback. Actual  feedback  will  be  based  on  fine  
tuning  the  system  for  Project  details. 
 
Here  is  how  the  proposed  Project  stands  to  benefit  from  the  research  undertaken  
for  this  dissertation: 
• In  terms  of  proprietary  affiliations,  the  research  looks  into  several  agencies  
connected  with  VoIP  projects;  for  instance,  VeriSign  for  PKI  attestation  and  
SS7  architecture,  Juniper  and  Sonus  for  Carrier  Networking  infrastructure,  
FIPS  for  AES  algorithms,  Aruba  for  VoWLAN  installation.  Apart  from  infra-
structure  companies,  we  also  are  introduced  to  testing  affiliates,  e.g.  Visu-
alRoute,  and  VoIP-calculator  in  Simulation  module. 
• Since  SIP  will  be  extensively  used  in  any  future  Project  development,  the  
research  has  brought  some  insightful  ideas  into  the  fore,  regarding  the  fault  
areas  of  that  protocol,  especially  from  a  security  angle.  Some  other  agen-
cies  have  been  mentioned  in  relation  to  SIP  interfaces  (Ch  2.8). 
• The  chapter  on  design,  (Ch  3)  covers  a  featured  deployment  of  VoIP  pro-
jects,  and  is  useful  from  the  point  of  view  of  resource  allocation.  Special  
emphasis  has  been  laid  in  the  chapter  on  the  indispensable  nature  of  ele-
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 mentary  details,  such  as  bandwidth  requirements,  QoS  framework  and  se-
curity  issues  mandatory  before  deployment. 
• The  Chapter  on  Simulation,  (Ch  3.1)  goes  one  step  ahead  in  consolidating  
our  knowledge  on  VoIP  projects,  as  it  focuses  on  actual  test  practice  re-
sults. 
5.3 Prospects for future work 
 
In  order  to  consolidate  our  total  knowledge  gains,  the  research  can  benefit  from  
complementary  modules  in  other  areas,  that  can  aid  in  the  development  of  VoIP  
Projects.  Laying  a  VoIP  infrastructure  requires  study  of  several  aspects,  closely  
connected  to  Project  Development.  Apart  from  theoretical  foundation  of  a  strong  
research  base,  it  requires  extensive  study  of  Business  development,  particularly  
Project  Implementation  courses.  Next  in  importance  lies  a  core  foundation  of  Le-
gal  areas;  VoIP  technology  has  came  in  for  much  criticism  in  many  countries,  
e.g.  China,  where  government-owned  telecom  agencies  filed  lawsuits  against  ser-
vice  providers  such  as  Skype,  and  refused  to  cooperate  because  VoIP  agencies  
are  able  to  afford  long-distance  calls  at  much  cheaper  rates  (Skype  charges  
$0.021  per  minute  for  any  landline  calls  in  the  USA  and  EU). Also,  there  are  
concerns  over  Privacy  laws  in  many  countries.  Although,  Skype  is  a  market  ex-
ception,  there  are  several  VoIP  service  providers,  who’ve  simply  jumped  on  the  
bandwagon  with  the  boom  in  this  technology  spectrum,  and  a  lot  of  improvement  
is  desired,  in  terms  of  providing  quality  service,  within  legal  framework. 
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 Within  technology  spectrum,  more  research  should  be  encouraged  in  mobile  
communications,  and  wireless  (Wi-fi)  technology,  as  these  are  integral  to  final  
phase  of  VoIP,  and  are  vital,  from  a  consumer  point  of  view. 
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